

CONF 502 Correlates of War and Peace

Sabancı University, Spring 2019

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Class Meets on Fridays, 16:40-19:30 @ FASS G043

Office Hours: F 15:30-16:30 and by appointment

Scope, Goals and Objectives

This seminar will survey theories of international conflict. Assigned readings will cover major theoretical perspectives, debates, and recent empirical research on the causes of international conflict and war. The seminar will also touch upon factors that influence the duration, severity and termination of international conflict. Special emphasis will be given to "unified theories", i.e. theories that concomitantly account for multiple stages of a conflict process. This seminar is intended to develop students' skills in building coherent arguments on complex international phenomena that lend themselves to empirical testing.

Upon completion of this course, students will (i) have read some of the most influential formal and empirical studies that have set the research agenda on international conflict during the last two decades, (ii) be able to identify some of the major debates re, (iii) develop logically coherent arguments on interstate dynamics (or any political event for that matter) that take the strategic linkages among that event's constituent stages into account.

Students should note that due to time constraints, we will not be able to cover a number of important topics of international conflict, such as rivalries, arms buildup, deterrence, etc. Students interested in such topics are encouraged to contact me. I will be happy to direct you to main readings on these topics.

Readings: The readings for this course are comprised of articles and chapters from books. Most of the readings are available through the Information Center's subscription to Web of Science. The instructor will provide copies of readings that cannot be retrieved online for photocopying.

Being a graduate course, CONF 502 entails a significant reading load. Furthermore, the reading load will vary across weeks. Therefore, students are advised to plan their reading schedule ahead of time. The class will be in a seminar format; all seminar participants are expected to read ALL of the required readings before coming to class.

Assignments & Grading

Response Papers: Students will turn in five response papers throughout the course of the semester. These papers will be one-page (one-half spaced) response papers that will reflect on the assigned weeks readings. In doing so, the students can approach the week's subject in a number of ways. Possible approaches can highlight recurring themes (or conflicting views) among that week's articles, discuss how these articles speak to the previous (or upcoming) weeks' topics, elaborate on an innovative research methodology, suggest alternative/novel avenues for research on the topic at hand, or any combination thereof. The response papers are due at Thursday noon (12:05 pm sharp) before class, so that I can see what raises most interest in class.

Students can choose any of the weeks that they like; however, a student cannot turn in two papers in a week. So, please plan accordingly. I strongly suggest that you start turning in papers early in the semester. Finally, please format your paper (including the biblio) before turning it in.

Discussion Leader: Each student will be assigned to a class session (starting with Week 3) during which s/he will assist me in leading the discussion. Students should prepare for this task by (i) reading probably a couple of more articles on the subject, (ii) thinking further about - and noting down possible points for discussion, (iii) share his/her preparation with me before class, and (iv) take an active stance during class.

During the first week of class, the students will fill in a survey indicating the weeks they are interested in. I will, then, assign the students to the weeks we have on schedule.

Participation: Students are expected to actively participate in class. To do so, students should do all of the readings and develop a good understanding of the material before coming to class. I will start discussions by randomly picking up students; so please be ready to respond to any of the readings on a short notice. Also, remember that this is a graduate seminar, as such the class's performance depends on each individual's contribution. Therefore, your physical and/or mental absence will be duly noted.

Midterm Exam: We will hold a mid-term exam during regular class hours on April 5, 2019, Friday. The exam will be open-book/opemn-computer where the students will choose one question out of three. The questions will assess analytical and comparison capabilities of students regarding the topics we have covered in class. More details will follow during the semester.

Final Exam: Take home-Literature Review: As their final examination, the students are expect to write a 5000-word (excluding references) literature review on a topic related to international conflict. Please note that literature reviews are not mere lists of what has been authored on the issue. Rather, strong literature reviews take an active stance in identifying debates, problematic aspects of existing findings, explaining , pointing out to further avenues of research on that topic. As such, you should develop a very good understanding, and a comfortable command of the literature on your topic. The list of topics that the students can write on and the deadline for submission will be announced later in the semester. Consulting literature review sections of recently published articles at top political science journals may be a good starting point. Please note that this assignment is considered as an exam by YOK regulations, and all the necessary disciplinary provisions apply.

Grade Breakdown:

Response Papers	30%
Participation	10%
Midterm Exam	20%
Literature Review	40%

Schedule

Week 1: Introduction

Read:

- This syllabus, *carefully*.
- The codebook for National Capabilities Index dataset from Correlates of War project at www.correlatesofwar.org

Week 2: What is International Conflict

Read:

- Stuart Bremer. Dangerous dyads: Interstate war, 1816-1965. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(2):309–341, 1992
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and et al. Symposium: Methodological foundations of the study of international conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, 29(1):119–153, 1985

- Paul Diehl. Just a phase? Integrating conflict dynamics over time. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 23(3):199–210, 2006
- Glenn Palmer, Vito dOrazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane. The mid4 dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, coding rules and description. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 32(2):222–242, 2015

Week 3: Power: Static Theories

Read:

- Frank Wayman. Bipolarity and war. *Journal of Peace Research*, 21(1):653–685, 1984
- William Moul. Power parity, preponderance, and war between great powers. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47(4):468–489, 2003
- Douglas M Gibler. State development, parity, and international conflict. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1):21–38, 2017
- Justin Conrad. How democratic alliances solve the power parity problem. *British Journal of Political Science*, 47(4):893–913, 2017

Week 4: Power: Dynamic Theories I

Read:

- AFK Organski and Jacek Kugler. *The War Ledger*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1980 Chapter 1
- Doug Lemke. *Regions of War and Peace*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2002, Chapters 1-4
- Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner. Power parity, commitment to change, and war. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(2):235–260, 1996
- Douglas Lemke. Power politics and wars without states. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4):774–786, 2008

Week 5: Power: Dynamic Theories II

Read:

- Brock F. Tesson and Steve Chan. Power cycles, risk propensity, and great-power deterrence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(2):131–153, April 2004
- Jack Levy. Declining power and the preventive motivation for war. *World Politics*, 40(1):82–107, 1987
- Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow. When do power shifts lead to war? *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(4):896–922, 1992
- Susan G. Sample. The outcomes of military buildups: Minor state vs. major powers. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(6):669–691, 2002
- Mark J. C. Crescenzi and Andrew J. Enterline. Time remembered: A dynamic model of interstate interaction. *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(3):409–431, 2001
- (optional) Paul Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi. System uncertainty, risk propensity, and international conflict among the great powers. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(3):478–517, 1992

Week 6: Democracy and War

Read:

- John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett. The kantian peace: The pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992. *World Politics*, 52(5):1-37, October 1999
- William Dixon. Democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict. *American Political Science Review*, 46(4):547-571, August 1994
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4):791-807, 1999
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Michael Koch, and Randolph Siverson. Testing competing institutional explanations of the democratic peace: The case of dispute duration. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 21(4):255-268, 2004
- Paul Senese. Between dispute and war: The effect of joint democracy on interstate conflict escalation. *Journal of Politics*, 59(1):1-27, 1997
- D. Scott Bennett and Alan Stam. The declining advantages of democracy: A combined model of war outcomes and duration. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(3):344-366, June 1998

Week 7: Other Domestic Influences: Audience Costs

Read:

- James D Fearon. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review*, 88(3):577-592, 1994
- Jessica L Weeks. Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. *International Organization*, 62(1):35-64, 2008
- Stephen Chaudoin. Promises or policies? an experimental analysis of international agreements and audience reactions. *International Organization*, 68(1):235-256, 2014
- Michael Tomz. Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. *International Organization*, 61(4):821-840, 2007
- Matthew S. Leventusky and Michael C. Horowitz. When backing down is the right decision: Partisanship, new information, and audience costs. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(2):323-338, 2012

Week 8: Other Domestic Influences: And some more

Read:

- Brandon C. Prins. Institutional instability and the credibility of audience costs: Political participation and interstate crisis bargaining, 1816-1992. *Journal of Peace Research*, 40(1):67-84, 2003
- Paul Huth and Todd Allee. Domestic political accountability and the escalation and settlement of international disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(6):754-790, 2002
- Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. Incomplete democratization and the outbreak of military disputes. *International Studies Quarterly*, 46(4):529-549, 2002

- Joe Clare. Democratization and international conflict: The impact of institutional legacies. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(3):259–276, 2007
- Brian Lai and Dan Slater. Institutions of the offensive: Domestic sources of dispute initiation in authoritarian regimes, 1950–1992. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(1):113–126, 2006

Week 9 (April 12): Midterm Exam

Week 10: Bargaining and War

Read:

- Game theory reader (please obtain the reader from me)
- Thomas C. Schelling. An essay on bargaining. *American Economic Review*, 46(3):281–306, 1956
- Robert Powell. Bargaining theory and international conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5:1–30, 2002
- James D Fearon. Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organization*, 49(03):379–414, 1995
- R. Harrison Wagner. Bargaining and war. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(3):469–484, July 2000
- Erik Gartzke. War is in the error term. *International Organization*, 53(3):567–587, Summer 1999
- Dan Reiter. Exploring the bargaining model of war. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1(1):27–43, 2003

Week 11: Interdependence and Conflict

Read:

- Brian M Pollins. Does trade still follow the flag? *American Political Science Review*, 83(2):465–480, 1989
- Katherine Barbieri, Omar M.G. Keshk, and Brian M. Pollins. Trading data: Evaluating our assumptions and coding rules. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 26(5):471–491, 2009
- Omar M. G. Keshk, Brian M. Pollins, and Rafael Reuveny. Trade still follows the flag: The primacy of politics in a simultaneous model of interdependence and armed conflict. *The Journal of Politics*, 66(4):1155–1179, 2004
- J Tyson Chatagnier and Kerim Can Kavaklı. From economic competition to military combat: Export similarity and international conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(7):1510–1536, 2017
- Katja B Kleinberg, Gregory Robinson, and Stewart L French. Trade concentration and interstate conflict. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(2):529–540, 2012

Week 12: Intervention

Read:

- Jeffrey Pickering. The structural shape of force: Interstate intervention in the zones of peace and turmoil, 1946–1996. *International Interactions*, 25(4):363–391, 1999

- Patrick M. Regan. Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(1):55–73, February 2002
- Michael T. Koch and Patricia Sullivan. Should I stay or should I go now? Partisanship, approval, and the duration of major power democratic military interventions. *Journal of Politics*, 72(3):616–629, July 2010
- Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani. The international military intervention dataset: An updated resource for conflict scholars. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(4):589–599, July 2009

Week 13: Mediation

Read:

- Andrew Kydd. Which side are you on? bias, credibility, and mediation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(4):597–611, October 2003
- Burcu Savun. Information, bias, and mediation success. *International Studies Quarterly*, 52(1):25–47, March 2008
- Kyle Beardsley. Intervention without leverage: Explaining the prevalence of weak mediators. *International Interactions*, 35(3):272–297, 2009
- Tobias Bohmelt. The effectiveness of tracks of diplomacy strategies in third-party interventions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(2):167–178, March 2010
- Babak RezaeeDaryakenari and Cameron G Thies. Secrecy and self-interest: When mediators act deceitfully. *International Interactions*, 44(4):603–630, 2018
- (optional) Frederick R Chen. Disentangling bias: national capabilities, regime type, and international conflict mediation. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, page online first, 2017

Week 14: Termination of Conflict

Read:

- Branislav Slantchev. How initiators end their wars: The duration of warfare and the terms of peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4):813–829, October 2004
- Patricia Sullivan. War aims and war outcomes - why powerful states lose limited wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(3):496–524, June 2007
- Elizabeth Stanley and John Sawyer. The equifinality of war termination multiple paths to ending war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(5):651–676, October 2009
- Kristopher W. Ramsay. Settling it on the field: Battlefield events and war termination. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(6):850–879, December 2008

Other Policies

Disability: If you anticipate needing any type of accommodation in this course or have questions about physical access, please tell the instructor until the end of add/drop period.

Academic Honesty: Science is a cumulative enterprise. Thus, effective and efficient quotation is a merit; it can only raise your grade. I will not, however, tolerate any plagiarism that I may come across. Please play it safe if you have questions on quoting and plagiarism. Refer to a librarian, the library webpage, resources at Turnitin webpage or me. Also note

that you cannot submit the paper or exam to two courses at the same time. However, you are more than welcome to elaborate on a topic of interest to you (such as your thesis) across various courses via multiple papers. Please consult me if you have any doubts regarding how different the papers that you submit to different courses should be.

Submission Policy: Missing deadlines are a fact of life, so are their consequences. I will deduct 10 points (out of a hundred) per 24 hours the paper not turned in after the deadline. Students are responsible for using SUCOURSE to submit their papers. The papers will be submitted in **MS Word** format.

Bibliography

- [1] Katherine Barbieri, Omar M.G. Keshk, and Brian M. Pollins. Trading data: Evaluating our assumptions and coding rules. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 26(5):471–491, 2009.
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- [4] Tobias Bohmelt. The effectiveness of tracks of diplomacy strategies in third-party interventions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(2):167–178, March 2010.
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- [7] J Tyson Chatagnier and Kerim Can Kavakli. From economic competition to military combat: Export similarity and international conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(7):1510–1536, 2017.
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- [13] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and et al. Symposium: Methodological foundations of the study of international conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, 29(1):119–153, 1985.
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- [16] William Dixon. Democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict. *American Political Science Review*, 46(4):547–571, August 1994.
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